Charles Sanders Peirce wrote the article “The probability of induction” in 1878. It was the fourth article of the series “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” which comprised a total of six articles. According to Peirce, to get a clear idea of the conception of probability, one has ‘to consider what real and sensible difference there is between one degree of probability and another.’ He endorsed what John Venn had called the ‘materialistic view’ of the subject, namely that probability is (...) the proportion of times in which an occurrence of one kind is accompanied by an occurrence of another kind. On the other hand, Peirce recognized the existence of a different interpretation of probability, which was termed by Venn the ‘conceptualistic view’, namely the degree of belief that ought to be attached to a proposition. Peirce’s intent on writing this article seems to be to inquire about the claims of the conceptualists concerning the problem of induction. After reasoning on some examples, he concluded on the impossibility of assigning probability for induction. We show here that the arguments advanced in his article are not sufficient to support such conclusion. Peirce’s thoughts on the probability of induction surely may have influenced statisticians and research scientists of the 20th century in shaping data analysis. (shrink)

George Boole published the pamphlet The Mathematical Analysis of Logic in 1847. He believed that logic should belong to a universal mathematics that would cover both quantitative and nonquantitative research. With his pamphlet, Boole signalled an important change in symbolic logic: in contrast with his predecessors, his thinking was exclusively extensional. Notwithstanding the innovations introduced he accepted all traditional Aristotelean syllogisms. Nevertheless, some criticisms have been raised concerning Boole’s view of Aristotelean logic as the solution of algebraic equations. In order (...) to circumvent such criticisms, we show here how Boole’s conclusions may be deduced from the axioms and inference rules proposed in his pamphlet, from which Aristotle’s deductions in Prior Analytics (including those that are completed through an impossibility) can be stated as theorems. We clarify his method for dealing with both universal and particular premises by means of his symbol v and demystify some criticisms concerning the way he expressed particular premises. Boole’s conclusions for some of those premises for which according to Aristotle there is no deduction are also discussed. The deductive system presented here has the potential to provide a new perspective on Boole’s approach to logic in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic. (shrink)

Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The (...) present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in. (shrink)

1. The present paper is a continuation of my “Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality,” which began with a description of the political philosophy of Robert Nozick. I contended in that essay that the foundational claim of Nozick's philosophy is the thesis of self-ownership, which says that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, consequently, that each is free to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against (...) others. To be sure, he may not harm others, and he may, if necessary, be forced not to harm them, but he should never be forced to help them, as people are in fact forced to help others, according to Nozick, by redistributive taxation. (shrink)

This book presents G. A. Cohen's Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1996. Focusing on Marxism and Rawlsian liberalism, Cohen draws a connection between these thought systems and the choices that shape a person's life. In the case of Marxism, the relevant life is his own: a communist upbringing in the 1940s in Montreal, which induced a belief in a strongly socialist egalitarian doctrine. The narrative of Cohen's reckoning with that inheritance develops through a series of sophisticated (...) engagements with the central questions of social and political philosophy. In the case of Rawlsian doctrine, Cohen looks to people's lives in general. He argues that egalitarian justice is not only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a matter of rules that define the structure of society, but also a matter of personal attitude and choice. Personal attitude and choice are, moreover, the stuff of which social structure itself is made. Those truths have not informed political philosophy as much as they should, and Cohen's focus on them brings political philosophy closer to moral philosophy, and to the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition, than it has recently been. (shrink)

I have enjoyed my six years as editor of this journal. I was pleased to be able to bring the journal to Purdue University Press and learn how to produce a first-rate academic journal. From the early days of choosing a cover design, to supervising my graduate assistant Jiwon Kim as she expertly sought indexing services, to acquiring an ISSN number, to being lucky to convince David Granger to become the book review editor and, with the next issue, editor, I (...) have been fortunate to work with excellent colleagues. I particularly want to thank the staff at Purdue University Press, especially its former director, Thomas Bacher, who agreed to publish the journal in 2004. Tom later moved the management of the journal's .. (shrink)

There has been much discussion about what, if any, legal and moral duties professionals have to disclose relevant genetic information to the family members of someone with an identified disease predisposing mutation. Here, we present a case report where dissemination of such a genetic test result did not take place within a family. In contrast to previous literature, there appeared to be no deliberate withholding of information, instead distant relatives were unable to communicate relevant information appropriately. When communication was facilitated (...) through the follow-up of a chance remark, the patient was able to avoid planned major surgery, with its attendant morbidity, and her high anxiety levels were much reduced. We believe this case highlights the need for an ongoing debate on how genetic services can best support patients and their families with disclosing relevant genetic information to other family members. (shrink)

On Roger Bacon's life and works, by A. G. Little.--Der einfluss des Robert Grosseteste auf die wissenschaftliche richtung des Roger Bacon, von Ludwig Baur.--La place de Roger Bacon parmi les philosophes du XIIIe siècle, par François Picavet.--Roger Bacon and the Latin vulgate, by Francis Aidan, cardinal Gasquet.--Roger Bacon and philology, by S. A. Hirsch.--The place of Roger Bacon in the history of mathematics, by David Eugene Smith.--Roger Bacon und seine verdienste um die optik, von Eilhard Wiedemann.--Roger Bacons lehre von der (...) sinnlichen spezies und vom seḣvorgange, von Sebastian Vogl.--Roger Bacons art des wissenschaftlichen arbeitens dargestellt nach seiner schrift De speculis, von J. Würschmidt.--Roger Bacon et l'horreur du vide, par Pierre Duhem.--Roger Bacon, his relations to alchemy and chemistry, by M. M. Pattison Muir.--Roger Bacon and gunpowder, by H. W. L. Hime.--Roger Bacon and medicine, by E. Withington. (shrink)

This study examines BDI logics in the context of Gabbay's fibring semantics. We show that dovetailing can be adopted as a semantic methodology to combine BDI logics. We develop a set of interaction axioms that can capture static as well as dynamic aspects of the mental states in BDI systems, using Catach's incestual schema G^[a, b, c, d]. Further we exemplify the constraints required on fibring function to capture the semantics of interactions among modalities. The advantages of having a fibred (...) approach is discussed in the final section. (shrink)

Now, we stand outcast and starving,Mid the wonders we have made….I belong to a school of thought which has been called analytical Marxism. Some of the partisans of this position, and that includes me, are deeply engaged by questions in moral and political philosophy which have not, in the past, attracted the attention of Marxists. We are concerned with exactly what a commitment to equality requires, and with exactly what sort of obligations productive and talented people have to people who (...) are relatively unproductive, or handicapped, or in special need. We seek a precise definition of what exploitation is, and we want to know exactly why it is wrong. (shrink)

In this stimulating work of political philosophy, acclaimed philosopher G. A. Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society in which distributive justice prevails, peopleâes material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality. In the course of providing a deep and sophisticated critique of Rawlsâes theory of justice, Cohen demonstrates that questions of distributive justice arise not only for the state (...) but also for people in their daily lives. The right rules for the macro scale of public institutions and policies also apply, with suitable adjustments, to the micro level of individual decision-making. Cohen also charges Rawlsâes constructivism with systematically conflating the concept of justice with other concepts. Within the Rawlsian architectonic, justice is not distinguished either from other values or from optimal rules of social regulation. The elimination of those conflations brings justice closer to equality. (shrink)